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The influence of economic conditions on electoral outcomes and on the popularity of incumbent politicians has been investigated at least since the 1970s, following the seminal works of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) , Mueller (1970) , and Kramer (1971) . Since then, numerous studies have proven the importance of economic voting, as surveyed by Paldam (2004) .
Most researchers have used measures of aggregate economic conditions to explain incumbent party vote shares or survey-based measures of the popularity of political entities. However, there are good reasons to think that local economic conditions may influence national electoral results, independently from the national economy. First, people may hold incumbent politicians accountable for the local economy because they think the policies implemented have had a stronger impact on industries located in their area of residence. Second, although voters may intend to evaluate incumbents for the evolution of the national economy, they perceive local conditions more accurately and may use them as proxies for the overall situation of the country. An additional reason to use data disaggregated at the local level is that in regression analyses it increases the number of degrees of freedom, allowing for a richer analysis.
However, the number of papers assessing the importance of local economic indicators on national electoral outcomes is small, and most studies focus on the U.S. and the U.K. 1 All studies report evidence confirming that it is important to take into account local as well as national conditions when trying to explain national electoral results. In the context of the 1997 British general elections, Johnston and Pattie (2001) go even further, arguing that voters 1 Among others, see Holbrook (1991) , Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) , Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) for U.S. presidential elections; and Johnston and Pattie (2001) The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the Portuguese legislative elections and parties in government. In section 3 we present the data and specify the empirical model. The empirical results are reported in section 4 and, finally, section 5 presents the conclusions.
Portuguese legislative elections and parties in government
After 48 José Socrates is the prime minister.
Data and model specification
The Votes. In the set of explanatory variables, we first include the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent in the previous balloting, Votes (Previous Election) .
This variable accounts for the support the main government party enjoyed at the start of the term and for factors not considered in the other explanatory variables, such as personal characteristics, ideology and party affiliation of voters, socioeconomic characteristics of each municipality, etc.
It is possible that, in each municipality, the votes for the main government party are affected by whether or not the mayor is affiliated with the latter. We account for this possibility by including the dummy variable Government's Party, which takes the value of one when the mayor's party is that of the Prime Minister, and equals zero otherwise. A positive coefficient can be expected if we assume that a mayor is able to help her party get more votes in her municipality.
However, if voters prefer not to concentrate all the power in one party, a negative coefficient could result for this variable. This would be in accordance with Alesina and Rosenthal's (1996) model for the U.S., which predicts a midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections.
As mentioned in the introduction, national economic conditions play an important role in legislative elections results. Furthermore, using time series data for Portugal, Veiga (2004a and 2004b) showed that higher inflation and unemployment lead to lower popularity and vote intentions for the government. Thus, negative estimated coefficients are expected for inflation (the percentage change in the CPI) and for the change in the unemployment rate. We also account for national economic conditions by including GDP growth and changes in employment and in the industrial production index. Because higher values of any of these imply improving economic conditions, which should lead to more votes for the incumbent, positive coefficients are expected for these three variables.
We also expect municipal economic conditions to affect votes. Although there is no data on inflation and unemployment rates at the municipal level, there is information on some variables that reflect the local economy's performance.
The first two used are the change in municipal employment and the change in average municipal real wages. Then, we include changes in two indexes that reflect municipalities' wealth: the INE's purchasing power index, and the Marktest's income index. 5 Increases in any of these variables imply improving economic conditions, so positive coefficients are expected.
Finally, we account for the effects of grants transferred by the central government to each municipality. have shown that in legislative election years, central governments increase the amount of funds transferred to municipalities, particularly non-formula grants. 6 If this opportunistic spending pays off in terms of votes obtained, the annual change in non-formula grants should turn out as statistically significant and positively signed.
The first group of estimations includes only the national economic variables, making its results easily comparable to those of Veiga and Veiga (2004a,b) . Then, in a second group, municipal level variables are incorporated in order to determine if local conditions also affect national legislative election results. The empirical model can be summarized as follows: , 1999 , 1995 , 1991 , 1987 , 1985 , 1983 , 1980 , 1979 278 ,..., 1
2002
where Votes it is the percentage of votes obtained in municipality i by the incumbent government's principal party in the election of year t, Votes i,prev.el. is the percentage of votes it obtained in the previous election, GP it stands for Government's Party, Nat is a vector of national economic variables (whose values are equal for all municipalities), Mun is a vector of municipal variables, ν i is the individual effect of municipality i, δ t is a dummy variable for the election of year t, ε it is the error term, α and γ are parameters and β 1 and β 2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. Descriptive statistics for all variables used are reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Empirical results
The first set of estimations performed includes only the political and the national economic variables. In order to determine the relevant time horizon for the Portuguese voters, we expressed the national economic variables in two different ways: first, as percentage changes from the previous year; and, second, as average percentage annual changes over the entire term (since the previous election year). 7
Results of the panel data models, controlling for fixed effects 8 of municipalities and election-specific effects, are shown in Table 3 . T-statistics are presented in parentheses and the degree of statistical significance is signalled with asterisks.
The number of observations, municipalities and elections, and the adjusted Rsquared are reported at the foot of the table. 7 Since most Portuguese governments did not complete their terms, we have different term lengths in our sample. Thus, in order to make the changes in economic variables comparable over terms, they are expressed as average annual changes. 8 Municipal dummy variables are globally statistically significant, and Hausman tests indicate that a fixed effects specification is always preferable to a random effects one.
[Insert Table 3 
about here]
The results indicate that there is a high degree of persistence in the percentage of votes, as the estimated coefficient of Votes (Previous Election) is almost 0.9. The principal party in government seems to do worse in municipalities controlled by mayors affiliated with it. In line with Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) , this result suggests that voters act strategically by trying to avoid the control of local and national governments by the same party.
Most of the results concerning national economic variables conform to our expectations. National Inflation has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% significance level in all estimations except that of column 5; the Change in the Unemployment Rate has a negative coefficient and is also statistically significant at the 1% significance level; GDP Growth has a positive coefficient (although it is not statistically significant in column 2); and the Change in Results indicate that both national and local economic conditions influence electoral outcomes, and that the former play a major role. The performance of the national economy is taken into account by inflation, unemployment/employment, GDP growth and the industrial production index. All national economic indicators were significant determinants of votes, with strongest results obtained when variables were measured as percentage changes over the year preceding elections.
Among the indicators of municipal economic performance employment, the purchasing power index, the income index, and the amount of non-formula grants received by municipalities from the national government also influence votes in legislative elections.
Our findings reinforce those of Veiga (2004a, 2004b ) that
Portuguese voters hold incumbents responsible for the evolution of the economy.
Economic voting is important in Portugal. They are also in line with most of the studies for other nations that highlight the stronger effect of national rather than local economic conditions on votes.
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